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SOLUTION OF
"DEFENSE OF THE GUILTY"
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.*
O UR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM of what Mr. Justin may or must
do in the case of Peter Beet will be clearer and more meaningful if
we begin our discussion by setting out a general statement of the moral
duties of an attorney in Mr. Justin's position.
The moralists' summarize under the four heads of knowledge, probity,
diligence and the charging of fees that are not excessive, the duties of an
attorney who is asked to represent a client. Only the first three of these
duties are referred to in the Moral Question here proposed.
The attorney sins if he has not, and does not timely procure, sufficient
knowledge both of the law and of the facts.2 This knowledge must be
sufficient for three purposes: to guide the attorney's decision that he will
take the case or refuse it, to enable the attorney to advise the client on his
rights and the best means to secure them, and to make it possible for the
attorney to present the client's cause adequately in court.
The attorney violates the duties of probity if he advises or undertakes
litigation which is unjust, or if he advises or uses unjust means to further
even a just cause. 3
The attorney fails in his duties of diligence if he does not exercise the
care and energy without which his advice and advocacy will be ineffective.
Usually, the duty of diligence arises out of the attorney-client relationship
established by voluntary engagement. Extraordinarily, however, an
attorney is bound by his professional status not to refuse his advice or
his advocacy in certain cases.
Viewing the given factual statements on Peter Beet's case in the light
of these general principles, we see that certain questions of fact are
material to a judgment that Mr. Justin should not undertake to advise
or defend Peter, or that Mr. Justin should or may do so upon certain
conditions.
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Acting Dean and Professor of Law, St. John's
University School of Law. Editor of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.
1 See ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI, I THEOLOGIA MORALIS §§218-26, at 427 (1839);
AERTNYS-DAMEN, I THEOLOGIA MORALIS §1236, at 869 (1947); PRiJMMER, HAND-
BOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY §289, at 133 (1957).
2 See Canon 8, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
3 See Canons 15, 16, 30, supra note 2.
DEFENSE SOLUTION
It seems that the general statement of the
case, thus viewed, raises the following ques-
tions of material fact:
(a) Did Peter drive the "death car"?
(b) Will Peter plead "not guilty"?
(c) At Peter's trial, will he or his
friends:
(1) offer false evidence,
(2) or offer true evidence harm-
ful to other persons?
(d) If Mr. Justin refuses to defend Peter,
will the defense have competent
counsel?
(e) If Mr. Justin delays until tomor-
row's hearing his decision to take
the case or to refuse it, will that
delay occasion injustice or handicap
the defense?
When Peter's additional statements pos-
tulated in Moral Question 4 are assumed,
the questions of fact labeled (a) and (b)
are resolved affirmatively. With this change
in the factual situation, the principle of
probity must be examined with greater pre-
cision: will the principle permit an attorney
to defend a person whose guilt is not doubt-
ful but certain, when it is also certain that
the guilty person will plead "not guilty"?
To answer the five Moral Questions in
the order and form in which they were
proposed would require much repetition or
cross references. -We prefer to offer first a
composite answer to all five Moral Ques-
tions, and then to relate the answer's several
clauses to our general statement of the at-
torney's duties.
In our opinion, Mr. Justin is morally
warranted to accept the case, either before
or after Peter's new statements postulated
in Question 4, provided that the attorney
takes effective steps to prevent any offer of
false evidence for the defense. He need not
exclude offers of true evidence harmful to
other persons, if the defense's employment
of such offers is justified by proportionate
necessity.
Further, we believe that Mr. Justin is
morally warranted to refuse the case imme-
diately if other competent counsel is avail-
able to Peter.4 But if such counsel is not
available, the attorney must find justifica-
tion for his refusal.
Finally, it seems to us that if Mr. Justin
wishes to postpone his decision to accept
the case or refuse it until tomorrow's hear-
ing, he is obliged to take care that his con-
duct does not occasion injustice, or put in
jeopardy Peter's rights or his attorney's con-
trol of the incidents of the trial.
Peter's Case is Just and
Maintainable by Just Means
When we answer that Mr. Justin is inor-
ally warranted to accept Peter's case, even
after receiving Peter's new statements pos-
tulated by Question 4, we judge that the
case is not unjust and that Peter's not guilty
plea can be maintained by just means.
A man who knows he is guilty of a crime
violates no moral duty when he pleads "not
guilty." A fortiori, his plea would not be
unjust if he were unsure of his guilt. In
either case, his cause is not unjust and the
attorney who undertakes it does not sin
against the duty of probity.5
The moral position of the guilty man who
pleads "not guilty" to a criminal accusation
is clearly distinguishable from that of the
defendant in a civil suit who is resisting a
just claim. Usually, the civil defendant is
4 See Canon 31, supra note 2.
5 See Canon 5, supra note 2.
resisting claims to things of economic value
only. Usually he is morally free to let the
plaintiff have the thing he claims; rarely, as
when the statute of limitations has run in
his favor, does he have a moral right to re-
sist the plaintiff's suit. The accused, on the
other hand, by his plea of "not guilty" is
vindicating his claim to enjoy life itself, or
liberty or good reputation. Normally he has
not only a right, but even a duty to make
this vindication; only rarely and exception-
ally is he morally bound not to do so.
When one pleads guilty to a serious crime
he seriously risks moral corruption through
the despair, the discouragement and the
evil associations which are the normal se-
quelae of conviction of crime and of the
penal discipline which follows upon con-
viction. For anyone who is not well ad-
vanced toward sanctity, this risk seems so
great as to gravely jeopardize salvation it-
self. So to jeopardize one's self is immoral
unless a very grave duty binds one to as-
sume the risk.6 No man simply because he
has violated a penal law, is morally obliged
to assume that risk.
The law of our states, like the law of
most modern nations and the present Canon
Law of the Church,7 does not oblige the
criminal to admit his guilt. Nor does the law
oblige him to accept penal discipline until
he has been convicted in a proceeding in
which he may deny his guilt, honestly chal-
lenge the evidence offered against him, and
6 St. Alphonsus accepted as probable, and there-
fore safely followed in practice, the opinion of
theologians who said that no one who can escape
the death penalty and other severe forms of pun-
ishment by withholding his confession is morally
bound to confess, even when the law purports to
oblige him to confess. ST. ALPHONsus LIGUQRI, I
THEOLOGIA MORALIS §274, at 438 (1839).
7 See CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Can. 1743, §1; Can.
1744; Can. 1748; Can. 1827; Can. 1830, §2.
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claim every benefit of the law -not the
least of which is the requirement that the
prosecution establish his guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt.
The law cannot put itself in the place of
God Who punishes guilt as guilt, for the
law lacks God's omniscience and omnipo-
tence. The law must find guilt before it
punishes. Yet the law must punish guilt,
not as guilt, but as a disturbance of social
order. 8 Thus it cannot use methods of de-
termining guilt which themselves disturb
the social order and alienate from the law
the minds of free and fair-minded men.
This is the reason why the law must, in our
world, assume the entire burden of estab-
lishing criminal guilt and cast none of that
burden upon the accused.
Of course the guilty can waive the bene-
fit of the law by confessing or pleading
guilty when charged. But neither the law of
man nor the law of God directly obliges him
to do so. The law of God requires of the
sinner repentance, reformation, reparation
of damage and penitential satisfaction, but
it does not require that, to accomplish
these, the sinner shall voluntarily take upon
himself human society's penal discipline.
It is only indirectly that God's law,
through the duties it imposes upon men
with respect to their neighbors, sometimes
obliges a guilty man to confess or to plead
guilty when charged with crime. When his
failure to confess or plead will certainly
harm another unjustly, or will leave the
wrongdoer a prey to harmful impulses he
cannot control, the criminal is morally
obliged to confess or to plead guilty and so
subject himself to penal discipline.
8 On the relation of justice and social necessity, as
bases of society's right to punish, see 1 ROBERTI.
DE DELICTIS ET POENIS §32, at 45.
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Under the facts presented, it does not
appear that Peter is a compulsive criminal.
Nor does it seem that if he pleads "not
guilty" he will become morally responsible
for another's being unjustly accused. True,
there is some ground for a suspicion that it
was Jimmy Patter who drove his sister to
her death, but the ground seems slight.
More important the factual statement does
not show that Peter, by moral fault direct
or wanton, created or enhanced the suspi-
cion which may be directed against Jimmy.
Peter's defense can, without injustice,
maintain that the evidence to be submitted
by the prosecution does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Peter drove the
"death car." It can point out that Patricia's
remark "License or no license, I ought to
drive us home" indicates that the girl may
well have been driving when the crash
occurred.
Clearly, it is Mr. Justin's responsibility,
if he takes the case, to use the knowledge
he has acquired as an assistant prosecutor
to estimate the likelihood that this defense
will succeed, and to decide whether Peter
may not get off with a lighter punishment
by pleading guilty. He should advise Peter
on these matters before Peter pleads at
tomorrow's hearing.9
The Defense Must Exclude
False Evidence
Mr. Beet's plan to consult his out-of-
state friends and to enlist the "loyal co-op-
eration" of Jimmy Patter and his father
looks very much like an attempt to put into
the mouths of Peter and Jimmy false state-
ments tending to exculpate Peter. Mr. Jus-
tin, if he takes Peter's case, must not permit
9 See Canon 8, supra note 2.
such statements to be offered in court.10 He
cannot discharge this responsibility by sim-
ply warning Peter and Jimmy to tell only
the truth. He should insist that, as Peter's
attorney, he shall be present when Mr. Beet
talks to Peter and when he talks to Jimmy
and Jimmy's father. This is required not
only by the attorney's duty to exclude un-
just means to advance a just defense," but
also by his duty to save Peter and Jimmy
from the harmful effects of such advice as
Mr. Beet may offer. If he leaves the boys to
Mr. Beet, they may evolve a story which,
if it does not cause them to be prosecuted
for perjury, may at least prejudice the jury
against Peter.
Now that Peter is sure he was the driver
of the "death car" and will plead "not
guilty" to the manslaughter charge, Mr.
Justin cannot permit him to take the wit-
ness stand. Some moralists hold that an
accused person is not guilty of lying when
he, in the face of questioning by the au-
thorities, denies facts from which his guilt
could be inferred, and even makes asser-
tions which are not true, to establish an
"alibi" or to otherwise weaken the force of
evidence against him. 12 This, they say, is
not lying, because the questioners have no
reasonable expectation that the accused will
tell them the truth and, they say further,
there is no lie when false statements are
made to one who does not expect or who
has no reason to expect, that the speaker
tells the truth. 1' Even if this view of lying
I0 See Canons 16, 22, supra note 2.
1 1SeeST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI, op. cit. supra note
1, §226, at 428.
12 See NOLDIN AND SCHMITT, II SUMMA THEO-
LOGIAE MORALIS §732, at 672 (1951).
1a See NOLDIN AND SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note
12, §638, at 578; CONNELL, OUTLINES OF MORAL
THEOLOGY 158 (1953); DORZYNSKI, CATHOLIC
TEACHING ABOUT THE MORALITY OF FALSEHOOD
49-64 (1948).
be assumed as correct, it certainly has no
application to statements made by a de-
fendant in our courts. Our law, unlike the
law of many European countries, does not
permit a defendant to be questioned in
court if he refuses to be sworn, and does
not permit him to make statements in court
unless he has taken the witness's oath. Once
he is voluntarily sworn to "tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,"
the court has every reason to expect that
he shall not make any false statements.
Therefore he cannot, without incurring the
moral guilt of perjury, make such false
statements as he might have made, without
moral fault, in a preliminary investigation
conducted by the police or by the prose-
cutor.
The Defense May Offer True Evidence
Which is Harmful to Others
For example, Peter's defense may call
Jimmy Patter as a witness, and elicit from
him admissions tending to show that his
activities on the night of the tragedy are
not so clearly accounted for as to exclude
some probability that he, rather than Peter,
was the driver of the "death car."
This is no abuse of the truth, because the
question in issue is not the question of who
actually drove the car, but the question of
whether the evidence put in by the prose-
cution proves beyond reasonable doubt that
Peter drove the car. Probity requires that
the defense attorney shall not, in question-
ing the witness or in argument, declare or
suggest that Jimmy actually drove the car,
but probity does not forbid questioning or
argument to the point that the evidence of
Peter's driving is inconclusive.
When the defense undertakes this line in
questioning and in argument, it must fore-
see that Jimmy will be harmed thereby.
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Some people may well believe that Jimmy
is lying, and the police may be led to harass
him with further questioning and investiga-
tion; possibly they may seek to have 'him
indicted if Peter is acquitted. Yet, it seems
to us, the defense may morally use the
questions and arguments which have these
evil indirect effects. The harm that may
come to Jimmy is not a direct effect of the
defense attorney's attack on the prosecu-
tion's evidence, nor is it a means used to
free Peter, nor does the defense intend that
Jimmy be suspected or harassed. To free
Peter, the defense shows the court that the
evidence against him is not so conclusive
as to warrant his conviction; this showing
is made by indicating that the evidence is
patient of a reasonably probable inference
that Jimmy drove the car. That Jimmy
drove is not urged as a certainty or as a
probability so strong as to found an indict-
ment against Jimmy, or even so strong as
to warrant a founded suspicion that Jimmy's
denial that he drove is a lie. These evil ef-
fects, if they follow on the defense argu-
ment, will follow only indirectly.
Thus, three of the four conditions which
justify an act having an indirect evil effect
are satisfied: "1. The act itself is morally
permissible. . . . 2. The evil effect is not
in the actor's intent. . . . 3. The evil effect
is not, in fact, a cause of the good ef-
fect .... "14
The remaining condition, "4. There is
just and proportionate reason for permit-
ting the evil effect. ... "15 seems also to be
satisfied if Mr. Justin conscientiously finds
that he cannot reasonably hope to make the
court see the inadequacy of the evidence
14 See PRUMMER, op. cit. supra note 1, §23, at 13;
Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality, 4
CATHOLIC LAWYER 51-52 (Winter 1958).
15 Ibid.
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against Peter without bringing before it the
evidence and argument which indirectly
embarrass Jimmy Patter. If the circum-
stances were such that we could seriously
expect that Jimmy would be unjustly con-
victed of perjury or manslaughter, we would
not say that the good effect of freeing Peter
was proportionate to the evil effect of the
defense tactic. But since probabilities here
are that Jimmy will suffer harm in a degree
much less than Peter would if his defense
failed because his attorney did not attack
the prosecution's evidence in the way here
proposed, we believe that there is cause,
both just and proportionate, for undertak-
ing the attack which will have an indirect
evil effect upon Jimmy Patter.
Justin May Refuse the Case If Other
Counsel is Availahle
An attorney, by reason of his office or
by reason of his special competence has no
moral duty to take any case offered to
him. 6
If he has a duty to take a given case, the
duty will arise from previous dealing with
the client, or from the virtue of charity
which obliges us to help our fellow man in
his necessities. 17 The duty of charity gen-
erally does not bind us to meet the neces-
sities of particular individuals, and it is
commonly discharged by help offered to
necessitous persons whom we freely choose.
Sometimes, however, our freedom to choose
the beneficiaries of our charity is limited.
Danger sometimes does more than invite
rescue - danger obliges rescue when the
danger is very grave and at the same time
remediable, if the circumstances indicate
16 See Canon 3 1, siipra note 2.
17 See PRbIMMER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§223-24,
at 97-99.
that there is only one competent rescuer
certainly available, and the task of rescue
puts upon him no burden seriously dispro-
portionate to the victim's danger.
Here Peter's danger seems grave and
remediable. He is in danger of conviction
of manslaughter and his father may lead
him to commit perjury. It seems that a com-
petent and conscientious attorney can save
Peter from further crime and perhaps pro-
cure at least a significant mitigation of dis-
grace and punishment.
Is Mr. Justin the only competent rescuer
certainly available? Before he can answer
that question, Mr. Justin must use his in-
telligence and experience to decide another
problem. It seems to us that the conduct
of the leaders of the Green County bar
indicates such a sensitiveness to popular
opinion that we may reasonably fear that
even when assigned by the court to the
defense they may not find in themselves the
courage and the proper single-mindedness
which the effective presentation of a de-
fense requires. The attitude of attorneys
toward unpopular clients, sometimes ex-
pressed "I will see that he gets a fair trial,
but I will not try to get him off" seems so
negative in spirit that it is not likely to
inspire that diligence which the client, the
law itself, and good morals, expect of a
defense attorney.18
Finally, Mr. Justin must weigh for him-
self his probable cost in assuming to defend
Peter Beet. If it will quite probably and
seriously jeopardize his career, he has cause
proportionate to Peter's danger for declin-
ing the invitation to rescue. We can say only
that Mr. Justin is morally bound to use his
best knowledge and a very high degree of
diligence in making that determination.
18 See Canon 15, supra note 2.
If Mr. Justin Postpones his Decision,
He Must Forestall Evil Effects of
That Postponement
Mr. Justin cannot, without injustice, per-
mit his postponement of decision to operate
as a connivance with Mr. Beet's project.'
He must either dissuade Mr. Beet from his
proposal, or insist on being present when
Mr. Beet sees Peter and Jimmy. If Mr. Jus-
tin does neither, his postponement tends to
encourage Mr. Beet to put false evidence
into the mouths of the boys. Further, the
fact that Mr. Justin will have been in con-
19 This discussion's moral premise is the moral
doctrine of indirect evil effects, on which see note
14, supra.
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tact with the case throughout this period is
calculated to mislead the boys, the court,
and any attorney who may later assume to
defend Peter Beet.
To stay in the case, even tentatively,
while leaving Mr. Beet free to carry out his
plan, may well forestall the court's quite
reasonable suspicions that the evidence had
been tampered with. It may well cause
Peter and Jimmy to commit perjury, per-
haps without realizing the wrongfulness of
their conduct or the risks it will involve
for them. It will leave Mr. Justin and any
other attorney defending Peter in ignorance
of the true state of the facts, and conse-
quently liable to seriously harmful errors
in planning the defense and its presentation.
